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ABSTRACT

Tension between science and the law is a pervading feature of
Endangered Species Act (ESA) jurisprudence. Incorporating the
scientific discipline of ecology within the legal landscape
presents distinct challenges, particularly in comparison with
more traditional laboratory sciences. Within the realm of
Endangered Species Act liability, the intricacies of nature
exacerbate already complicated links of causation, challenging
the ability to prove violations of the “take” prohibition. Because
uncertainties permeate scientists’ ability to understand complex
ecosystem processes, courts should rely on the overarching
practicality of common law principles when reviewing ecological
testimony.
When evaluating claims that allege violations of the “take”
prohibition, the proximate causation standard operates as a
threshold to prevent assigning liability to a party or entity that
otherwise may be just one insignificant link in an attenuated
ecological chain. The proximate causation standard advanced by
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the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home demonstrates the
practicality of maintaining established legal principles,
specifically as a limit to relying on scientific testimony as a
means of proving causation. More recently, the reasoning in
Aransas Project v. Shaw, where an environmental group alleged
that the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality caused the
“take” of endangered whooping cranes, illustrates the challenges
associated with proving the cause of ecological injuries. Although
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas assigned ESA liability based on scientific testimony, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court because this attenuated
chain of causation lacked the required proximate cause analysis.
In the context of ESA liability, where judges must understand
complex ecosystem processes, this dichotomy reflects the
reliability of proximate causation as a foundation to ensure
equitable results.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing importance of science in the legal
arena, distinct scientific disciplines present courts with
challenges. The successful preservation of endangered or
threatened species requires an understanding of the scientific
discipline of ecology.1 In the realm of Endangered Species Act
(ESA) liability, the inherent complexity associated with
ecological injuries exacerbates the task of proving causation. The
extension of ESA liability to attenuated links of causation has
provoked much debate, particularly because these conditions are
often prevalent in nature. Although environmentalists recognize
that the ESA is essential to the survival of listed species, private
landowners often denounce these same provisions as
overreaching intrusion by a governmental entity.2
In this light, the proximate causation standard can function as
a necessary safeguard to prevent assigning liability to a party or
entity that otherwise may be just one insignificant link in an
attenuated ecological chain. In the context of proving causation
for ESA liability, ecological testimony may degrade the court’s
ability to reach an equitable outcome. Thus, proximate causation
is an essential piece of the ESA liability puzzle. Regarding the
unique challenges encountered within the discipline of ecology,
this article explores the practicality of the proximate causation
requirement—particularly as a necessary restraint on the
principles set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.3
In The Aransas Project v. Shaw, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), in its authority
1. J. PEYTON DOUB, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
IMPLEMENTATION, SUCCESSES, AND CONTROVERSIES 19 (2013).
2. JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 141 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the “lively theoretical
debate” that follows the imposition of ESA liability for indirect takings of
endangered species as a result of habitat modification).
3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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to manage state water rights, was liable for the “take” of
whooping cranes in violation of ESA § 9. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the holding because the Aransas Project
failed to prove that TCEQ’s water permitting program was the
proximate cause of the deaths of twenty-three endangered
whooping cranes during the drought of 2008-09. As seen during
the course of the Aransas Project litigation, proximate causation
ensures that trial court decisions are founded upon established
legal theory, rather than the complexities of understanding
scientific methodology.
This article does not dispute the importance of science within
the legal discipline. Rather, it explores the practicality of
incorporating various scientific disciplines into the law, such
that the principles underlying these disciplines present
inherently different challenges. The dichotomy is apparent from
a broad perspective: “In environmental policy, the data gaps
between what the law demands and what science supplies reflect
the disparate objectives and epistemological approaches of the
two fields.”4 Although scientific evidence and testimony will
obviously continue their essential roles, the presence of science
in the courtroom should not detract from the established truism
of proximate causation when examining causal links in complex
ecosystems.
This article begins by outlining the conflict in Aransas Project,
describing the relationship between the endangered whooping
crane, their essential habitat, and Texas water rights. In Part
III, the article reviews the ESA “take” prohibition, specifically
elaborating on the importance of Justice O’Connor’s adherence to
the standard of proximate causation in Babbitt v. Sweet Home.5
Part IV explores the challenges associated with proving the
cause of an ecological injury, an issue exacerbated by the
Daubert trilogy, which enumerated a framework for courts to
address the admissibility of scientific testimony.6 Finally, Part V

4. Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem
of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 661 (2008).
5. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
712-13 (1995).
6. See infra notes 96-127 and accompanying text.
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analyzes the Aransas Project litigation, illustrating the
dichotomy between the district court’s dependence on scientific
testimony and the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on proximate
causation. Part VI concludes by framing the Aransas Project
decisions as precedent within the broader ESA debate. In the
realm of ecology and the ESA, traditional scientific research
settings, such as the laboratory or field, are the best arena for
scientific debate, particularly when adherence to proximate
causation may enhance the court’s ability to reach an equitable
decision.
II.
BACKGROUND

A.

The Plight of the Whooping Crane

Whooping cranes (Grus americana) currently face the threat
of extinction, with merely 500 individuals estimated to exist
worldwide.7 This “majestic bird” is the largest bird in North
America, standing an imposing height of five-feet and possessing
a wingspan greater than eight-feet.8 In 1970, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed the species as
endangered, affording the crane protection under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).9 The world’s only wild population
of whooping cranes is the Aransas-Wood Buffalo (AWB) flock,
comprised of approximately 300 individuals.10 The flock annually
migrates thousands of miles: from Canada’s Wood Buffalo
National Park in the northern Alberta province, to their
wintering grounds in Aransas National Wildlife Refuge, Texas
(Aransas Refuge).11

7. Aransas Project v. Shaw (Aransas Project I), 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723
(S.D. Tex. 2013).
8. Aransas Project v. Shaw (Aransas Project II), 756 F.3d 801, 806 (5th Cir.
2014).
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. The whooping cranes endangered listing was
“grandfathered” in to the Endangered Species Act when it was passed in 1973.
Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
10. Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d at 806.
11. Id.
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Robert Porter Allen, a prominent ornithologist in the early
twentieth century, initiated conservation efforts to bring this
iconic bird back from the brink of extinction. Allen best described
the plight of this species: “If we succeed in preserving the wild
remnant that still survives, it will be no credit to us; the glory
will rest on this bird whose stubborn vigor has kept it alive in
the face of increasing and seemingly hopeless odds.”12 Despite
being on the verge of extinction in 1941 with just fifteen wildbirds remaining, federal and state conservation efforts have
continued the arduous and resource-intensive process of species
recovery.13
B.

Guadalupe Estuary

Each fall, whooping cranes embark on their annual migration
from the Canadian breeding grounds to the species’ winter
habitat in the Aransas Refuge, subsequently returning to
Canada in April of the following year. The Aransas Refuge,
located along the Texas gulf coast, is comprised of 9,000 hectares
of salt flats and surrounding estuarine areas.14 San Antonio Bay,
commonly referred to as the Guadalupe estuary, is adjacent to
the crane’s wintering ground in the Aransas Refuge and
considered part of the flock’s critical habitat.15
An estuary is a semi-enclosed body of water where the
freshwater and saltwater mix, often described as the area “where
the river meets the sea.”16 As a result, estuaries are one of the
most highly productive natural systems on earth. The
Guadalupe estuary receives freshwater inflows from the San

12. See The Whooping Crane, OPERATION MIGRATION (last visited Feb. 24,
2015), http://www.operationmigration.org/the-whooping-crane.asp. See generally KATHLEEN KASKA, THE MAN WHO SAVED THE WHOOPING CRANE: THE
ROBERT PORTER ALLEN STORY (2012) (describing Robert Allen’s work on behalf
of the whooping crane).
13. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 756.
14. Id. at 723.
15. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d at 806; Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d
at 722-23.
16. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (explaining that the San
Antonio River flows into the Guadalupe River system, which flows directly into
the Aransas Refuge before emptying into the Guadalupe Estuary).
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Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers, maintaining a dynamic
ecosystem that provides the whooping crane flock with essential
foraging habitat.17 Foraging behavior greatly affects a
population’s health, ability to survive, and reproductive ecology,
as an animal’s search for food resources is fundamentally
intertwined with its environment.
C.

Relationship Between Texas Water Rights and Freshwater
Inflow in the Guadalupe Estuary

The quantity of freshwater flowing into the cranes’ critical
habitat in the Guadalupe estuary is related to the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) permitting
authority for Guadalupe River withdrawals.18 The TCEQ has
general jurisdiction over both “surface water and water rights” in
Texas.19 The surface waters are owned by the State of Texas,
such that “the water of the ordinary flow. . .of every flowing
river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the
Gulf of Mexico.”20 Unless exempted by a statute, no person may
divert, store or impound state-owned water without TCEQ’s
authorization.21
TCEQ authorizes withdrawals of surface water by issuing
withdrawal permits or certificates of adjudication.22 In Texas,
the right to withdraw surface water is usufructuary, such that
the owner has a right of use, but not complete ownership.23 The
prior appropriation doctrine governs Texas’ water rights,
invoking the principle of “first in time, first in right.” This
provision regulates the allocation process and resolves conflicts
between lawful appropriators in times of water shortage.24 The
17. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d at 806.
18. Id.
19. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.013(a) (West 2015).
20. Id. § 11.021.
21. Id. § 11.081.
22. Id. § 11.121, 11.042. Some water rights, such as domestic and livestock
uses, are exempt from the permitting or adjudication process. Id. § 11.142.
23. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 842 (Tex. 2012).
24. See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 738 n. 28-29 (S.D. Tex. 2013);
see generally Ronald Kaiser, 6-TX WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS II
(LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 3rd ed. 2015) (describing the evolution and
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oldest water right is the most senior and enables its owner to
withdraw all of the water to which he is entitled before a more
junior right holder can take his allocation.25
Although the Texas Water Code requires TCEQ to consider
environmental impact in its permitting decisions, the Code does
not authorize TCEQ to grant water rights for instream flows
based on environmental concerns.26 The regulatory scheme
includes a “during emergencies” provision, such that permitting
related to environmental flows might be suspended during
drought conditions.27 Texas water rights, through the TCEQ’s
permitting requirements and regulatory powers, may influence
the quantity of freshwater reaching the state’s estuaries, thus
potentially affecting the availability of freshwater to users
throughout the state.28
Involving a finite resource, the issue of sufficient freshwater
flow will continue to be a source of conflict in this state,
particularly as the dichotomy between those interested in the
health of Texas estuaries and those interested in securing water

current state of Texas permitting and water rights).
25. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.027 (West 2015). In 1967, the Texas
Water Rights Adjudication Act required all appropriators of surface waters to
prove their usage in court. The adjudication process clarified who held a right to
withdraw water, eliminated prior regimes, and recorded the priority of the
rights to divert state water. See In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the
Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 43942 (Tex. 1982).
26. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(c)-(d)(1); Aransas Project I, 930 F.
Supp. 2d at n. 26. In 2000, the San Marcos River Foundation sought to
appropriate 1.3 million acre-feet of water to remain instream for the benefit of
the Guadalupe/San Antonio Bay and estuary system. The TCEQ denied the
permit in 2003 and the Foundation challenged the denial. Before the lawsuit
was decided; however, the Texas legislature enacted § 11.0237(a), prohibiting
the issuance of permits to leave water instream for the benefit of bays and
estuaries. See Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. San Marcos River Found., 267
S.W.3d 356, 357-360 (Tex. App. 2008).
27. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(c) (West 2015). “The key question is
whether TCEQ actually has authority to remedy the problem: that is, whether,
given a drought (which constitutes an emergency), TCEQ can still provide water
for the cranes. Pursuant to § 11.0235(c), TCEQ appears not to have that power.”
Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir. 2014).
28. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
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supplies for agricultural, industrial, or municipal uses becomes
more apparent.
D.

The Aransas Project’s Allegations Against TCEQ

During the winter of 2008-09, coinciding with a severe
drought, Aransas Refuge researchers noted an increase in
whooping crane deaths within the Guadalupe Estuary and
surrounding areas.29 The incident motivated environmentalists,
coastal businesses, bird enthusiasts, and others to form “The
Aransas Project” (TAP), a non-profit Texas-based entity. The
purpose of the alliance was to promote responsible water
management of the Guadalupe River basin and to ensure that
freshwater continues to flow from the Texas Hill Country to the
bays.30
In hopes of alleviating this concern, TAP argued that TCEQ’s
management of water diversions along the San Antonio and
Guadalupe River systems caused the deaths of endangered
whooping cranes.31
On March 10, 2010, TAP filed a lawsuit alleging that the
TCEQ violated the ESA’s “take” prohibition.32 TAP requested
injunctive relief to ensure that the AWB flock has sufficient
water resources to prevent future “takes” of whooping cranes.33
TAP alleged that TCEQ water permitting reduced the quantity
of freshwater that flowed to the coast, resulting in high salinity
levels throughout the Guadalupe estuary.34
TAP argued, most importantly, that these high salinity levels
decreased the abundance of blue crabs (Callinectes sapidus) and
wolfberries (Lycium carlinianum),35 which are the primary
nutritional resources for whooping cranes. According to TAP, the
cranes experienced food stress upon altering their foraging

29. Id. at 724.
30.
About
The
Aransas
Project,
THE
ARANSAS
http://thearansasproject.org/about (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
31. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 726.
34. Id. at 725.
35. Id.

PROJECT,
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behavior to search for additional resources.36 TAP suggested that
the birds expended more energy foraging for alternative prey—
ultimately resulting in emaciation and increased susceptibility to
disease, followed by eventual death.37
The crux of TAP’s argument was that both TCEQ’s actions
(and inaction), with regard to the management of freshwater
diversions along the San Antonio and Guadalupe River systems,
caused “harm” to the endangered whooping cranes by actually
injuring and killing an estimated twenty-three birds.38 TAP
named several TCEQ officials as defendants, including
Chairman Bryan Shaw.39 The court granted leave to intervene
for multiple parties, including the Guadalupe-Blanco River
Authority, the Texas Chemical Council, and the San Antonio
River Authority.40 For purposes of this article, all state and
intervening defendants are hereinafter referred to collectively as
“TCEQ.” The numerous amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of
both parties highlight the statewide ramifications of the
decision, particularly for agricultural and municipal interests, as
well as environmentalists.41

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 725. TAP also named as defendants, in their respective official
capacities: Carlos Rubinstein, a TCEQ Commissioner; Buddy Garcia, a former
TCEQ Commissioner; Mark Vickery, a former TCEQ Executive Director; and Al
Segoiva, the South Texas Watermaster. Id. at 725 n.12.
40. Id. at 725. The court also denied the motion for leave to intervene for
several parties, including Union Carbide, Texas Farm Bureau, San Antonio
Water System, and San Antonio City Public Service. Id.
41. Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 808 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014). In support of
TAP, Defenders of Wildlife, Nature Canada, and various law professors filed
amicus briefs. The Texas Public Policy Foundation, the City of Kerrville, CPS
Energy, City of Victoria, Texas Water Conservation Association, and Texas
Farm Bureau, each filed amicus briefs on behalf of TCEQ. Id.
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III.
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) LIABILITY
Described as the “pit bull” of environmental laws, the
Endangered Species Act is among the most “revered and reviled”
tools for ecosystem protection.42 The ESA scrutinizes activities
that may affect listed species and provides rigorous protection
through the conservation of ecosystems, particularly those that
serve as critical habitat for threatened and endangered species. 43
Although decisions to assign liability may positively affect the
health of certain populations, these same decisions may serve as
a detriment to the development or use of natural resources,
including land and water.44
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court
broadly proclaimed that the ESA’s purpose was “to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”45
This comprehensive legislation represented a regulatory scheme
to preserve biodiversity, whereby populations could increase
through conservation and protection measures.46

42. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2014);
Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998)
(discussing the origins of the pit bull reputation); NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 2,
at 141. Nagle and Ruhl offer insight regarding ESA’s controversial reputation:
Its champions praise it for saving the bald eagle from extinction, for blocking
many misconceived development projects, and for providing a tool to protect
ecosystems ranging from the southern California coast to the majestic forests
of Pacific northwest. Its detractors accuse it of sacrificing timber jobs for
obscure owls, nearly completed dams for tiny fish, and small farmers for
unknown rodents. The basis for these claims lies in the unparalleled
stringency of the ESA’s provisions.

Id. (emphasis added).
43. See generally DOUB, supra note 1, at 9, 12 (discussing the use of the ESA

to protect against adverse impacts, such as habitat destruction).
44. See Eugene H. Buck, M. Lynee Corn, & Pamela Baldwin, The
Endangered Species Act and “Sound Science,” in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: PRIMER, EVALUATION AND PROSPECTS 147 (Harold B. Carleton ed., 2009).
45. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
46. See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 2, at 255 (discussing the destruction of
critical habitat and labeling it as the primary factor influencing the decline of
many listed species, especially in consideration of the deleterious effects of
limited resource availability).
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Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to prevent the further
elimination of threatened and endangered species in the United
States.47 Scientific review is at the core of ESA jurisprudence, as
science is particularly important to the listing process,
designating critical habitat, and to proving the “take” of a
protected species.48 Section 4 authorizes the USFWS and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to
identify and list species as endangered or threatened.49 The ESA
requires that agencies found their decisions “solely on the basis
of the best scientific and commercial data available.”50 These
agencies may then designate critical habitat and develop
recovery plans, further incorporating scientific considerations
into the agency consultation process.51
A.

Section 9 “Take” Prohibition

ESA §9 prohibits both indirect and deliberate “takes” of all
species listed as endangered.52 The ESA broadly defines “take”

47. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)-(c).
48. Id. § 1533(b). Implementation of the ESA depends on expert agencies,
such as the USFWS for terrestrial species and NOAA for marine species.
Section 7 allows Courts to incorporate scientific data, perhaps more
appropriately, into their decisions. Pursuant to § 7(a)(2), any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by a federal agency cannot jeopardize the existence of
listed species or destroy its critical habitat. Id. § 1536(a)(2). TAP’s allegation of
liability did not proceed under this part of the ESA because the TCEQ did not
have a federal nexus, such that the TCEQ’s water-permitting decisions were not
funded, authorized, or carried out by a federal agency. Id.
49. See generally id. § 1533 (providing regulatory authority to determine
whether a species is endangered or threatened).
50. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A); see also N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479,
483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (suggesting that the USFWS rely on expert scientific
analysis to support a determination to not list a species). Under this evidentiary
standard, the decision to list a species only considers the best scientific data
available, whereas the decision to designate critical habitat considers both
scientific data and economic impacts. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)-(2).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)-(2), (f).
52. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B); see generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 (1995) (stating that Congressional
action strongly suggested that Congress understood ESA §9 “to prohibit indirect
takings as well as deliberate takings”); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st
Cir. 1997) (stating that “a governmental third party pursuant to whose
authority an actor directly exacts a taking of an endangered species may be
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as any actions or inactions that “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” a protected species.53
More specifically, the term “harm” prohibits “significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”54
The ESA authorizes citizen-suits, as federal district courts
have jurisdiction to enforce ESA provisions.55 The party alleging
the “take” must satisfy the requirement of standing by
demonstrating they have suffered an injury in fact, that the
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions, and that a
favorable decision will likely redress the injury.56
The “take” prohibition governs the actions or inactions of all
“persons,” including any “officer, employee, agent, department,
or instrumentality of. . .any state.”57 Much controversy
surrounds the extension of ESA liability to private landowners
and developers, as the discovery of an endangered species on
individual’s property may prevent the landowner from using that
property.58
Perhaps even more controversial, this prohibition also applies
to actions by state agencies that adversely affect the habitat of a
species, potentially resulting in the indirect “take” of an
endangered species.59 In fact, citizens have challenged this
deemed to have violated the provisions of the ESA”).
53. 16 U.S.C §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1).
54. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006); Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690-91, 696 (upholding
definition).
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (without regard for the amount-in-controversy or
party citizenship requirements).
56. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Aransas
Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 728 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
58. See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 2, at 255.
59. See generally id. at 291(referencing use of the ESA to alter fireworks
celebrations in Connecticut, development of beach properties on Long Island,
and using trucks on a beach in Long Island while filming a movie); Shannon
Petersen, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle: How the ESA Will Reshape
American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 438-40 (arguing that Strahan and
Loggerhead Turtle were wrongly decided because state regulatory regimes
governing private activities cannot be the proximate cause of an ESA take
violation).
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prohibition under a range of situations. In Strahan v. Coxe,
citizens challenged the issuance of licenses by a Massachusetts
agency that allowed fishermen to use gear that entangled and
harmed northern right whales.60 As a “third-party taking”
situation, the court enjoined the state from permitting the entire
fishing industry to use the harmful gear, rather than
adjudicating multiple citizen-suits against each individual
commercial fishermen.61
An alleged activity need not directly kill or injure the species
to violate ESA §9; rather, the activity may indirectly harm the
species by modifying its essential habitat. When the connection
between the activity and alleged “take” is less direct,
establishing remote chains of causation impedes a court’s ability
to rule on the “take” prohibition.
Although science plays a vital role in the listing process and
ability to promulgate other ESA provisions,62 using science as a
vessel to establish causation is a much more convoluted
enterprise, especially with regard to proving a violation of the
“take” prohibition.
B.

Justice O’Connor’s Reliance on Proximate Causation in the
Realm of ESA Liability

In her Babbitt v. Sweet Home concurring opinion, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor qualified the Court’s understanding of the
“take” definition, noting that the prohibition is subject to

60. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158-59 (1st Cir. 1997).
61. See generally id. at 161-63, 171-72 (discussing the various types of
harmful gear subjected to permitting requirements and the court’s support of
the injunctive relief provided by the lower court). Citizens have also alleged ESA
liability against Maine for the state’s authorization of foothold traps that
harmed lynx and against a Florida county for its refusal to ban beach driving
during turtle nesting season. See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19,
21-22 (1st Cir. 2010); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., 148
F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 1998).
62. The ESA requires that listing of endangered and threatened species be
based solely on the “best scientific and commercial data available.” 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(1)(A). In addition, formal consultation under § 7 requires the
submission of a biological assessment, which identifies whether any threatened
or endangered species are likely to be affected by the proposed federal action at
issue. Id. § 1536(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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“ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce
notions of foreseeability.”63 Proximate cause serves to limit the
ramifications of the “take” prohibition because it is inequitable to
assign liability “for every effect that could be causally linked to
[an actor’s] conduct regardless of how remote, unusual, or
unforeseeable the consequence.”64
Sweet Home tightened the proof of “take” analysis by
implementing the tort-like tests of “proximate” and “but-for”
causation.65 According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended
to assign ESA liability to foreseeable events—rather than
accidental effects on protected species.66
Although courts encounter “difficult questions of proximity
and degree” when assessing “limitless fact patterns” to
determine whether an activity caused the “take” of a species,
principles of proximate causation offer a familiar guide for the
judiciary.67 The blurred line of demarcation between punishable

63. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S., 687,
709 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Court did not actually rule on
whether there was a “take” in the case. Instead, the Court sought to determine
whether the Secretary of Interior overreached his authority under the ESA by
extending the definition of “takings” to include the more robust definition of
“harm”, such that any “significant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering,” violates the “take”
prohibition. Id. at 691-99.
64. Id. at 713; Fischman, supra note 4, at 688. Professor J.B. Ruhl describes
the Sweet Home holding as a “Pyrrhic” victory for environmental groups,
particularly because principles of proximate cause were a “stunning blow to the
statute’s vitality” that cannot be interpreted as a “shot of adrenaline for the
ESA.” J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall From Grace in the Supreme
Court, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 488, 502-03 (2012).
65. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13; See Ruhl, supra note 64, at 502.
66. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700. Additionally, the decision required
plaintiffs to establish that specific individuals were injured, rather than the
protected population as a whole. Commentators suggest that the Court based its
adherence to principles of proximate cause on the fact that the harm regulation
emphasizes the word “actually.” See Fischman, supra note 4, at 688.
67. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708, 713. See Tara L. Mueller, Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities: When is Habitat Modification a Take? , 3
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 333, 338 (1996). See generally Alan M.
Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and
Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (Fall 2001) (discussing the burden of
proving harm given “difficult questions of proximity and degree” after Sweet
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and non-punishable “takes” illuminates the daunting issues
encountered when proving causation.68
In her Sweet Home concurrence, Justice O’Connor expounded
upon the majority ruling in two aspects. First, she specified that
the “significant habitat modification” prohibition was limited to
situations that cause “actual, as opposed to hypothetical or
speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals.”69
Next, Justice O’Connor criticized the imposition of ESA liability
in Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Natural Resources,
indicating that the decision lacked the requisite proximate
causation analysis.70 In Palila, plaintiffs alleged that the State
violated the ESA when it allowed feral mouflon sheep and goats
to graze on seedlings, thereby preventing the growth of essential
habitat used by the endangered palila bird.71 The Ninth Circuit
held that the Hawaii state agency violated the ESA by allowing
feral sheep to eat seedlings, a resource that might have fed and
sheltered the endangered bird once the seedlings were fullygrown.72 In her analysis of Palila II, Justice O’Connor articulated
the flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, which imposed ESA
liability “no matter how long the chain of causality between
modification and injury.”73 According to Justice O’Connor, the
state agency could not have proximately caused the death of the
protected birds by allowing the sheep to consume and ultimately

Home); LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES
DESKBOOK 68 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the Sweet Home Court’s emphasis on

foreseeability during “take” analyses).
68. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 67, at 68-69. Justice Stevens’
majority ruling allowed for the possibility that some harm proceeding from
habitat modification will be “minimal and unforeseeable,” and not in violation of
the ESA. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 699-700.
69. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708-09 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 709, 713-14 (referencing Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural
Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)).
71. See Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107.
72. See id. at 1110-11.
73. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 711-12, 714. See generally Frona M.
Powell, Defining Harm Under the Endangered Species Act: Implications of
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 131 (1995) (examining the implications
of Sweet Home for future cases).
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destroy the seedlings, a resource which may or may not have
grown into trees and suitable habitat.74
The proximate causation standard is contingent upon
considerations of fairness, which prevent “imposing liability for
remote consequences.”75 Because the concept of proximate
causation does not have a precise definition, Justice O’Connor
instead illustrated both ends of the spectrum:76 for example, the
element of proximate causation is not satisfied when a farmer’s
fertilizer is diverted by a tornado and deposited in a wildlife
refuge, causing the death or injury of protected species.77
Conversely, when an individual extracts water from a reservoir
on his property and kills an endangered fish, the proximate
causation standard is more likely to be satisfied.78
Proximate causation acts as a threshold to eliminate the
opportunity to assign liability in the context of bizarre
situations.79 More precisely, the standard functions as an
equivalent to foreseeability and duty in normal tort cases,
particularly because it considers the “natural and probable
consequences” of an act.80
In ESA liability cases, federal courts determine whether there
is sufficient proof to uphold the proximate causation standard by
performing “the type of case-by-case analysis prescribed by
Sweet Home.”81 Two years after Sweet Home, the district court
in Strahan held that the state of Massachusetts had violated the
“take” prohibition by allowing commercial fisheries to trawl in
endangered right whale habitat.82
The First Circuit evaluated scientific evidence indicating that
over one-half of the examined right whales bore scars from

74. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713-14.
75. Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); Grubart v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527, 536 (1995); Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994)).
81. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 67, at 69.
82. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1997).
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fishing equipment.83 The court noted examples of actual
entanglement, and though the circumstances of causation were
not particularly direct, they were not attenuated to the point of
being outside the realm of foreseeability:84 Entanglement was a
foreseeable type of harm of which the agency authorized despite
having knowledge that endangered right whales could be caught
in the devices.85
Even with robust scientific testimony, proving the “take” of an
endangered species is difficult when trying to establish chains of
causation within complex ecosystems. In Greenpeace Foundation
v. Mineta, the plaintiffs alleged that the commercial lobster
fishery was causing the “take” of the endangered Hawaiian
monk seal.86 Greenpeace argued that the seal population was
dwindling because of low birth rates and shrinking food supplies,
primarily as a result of commercial fishing operations. Although
the fishery may have modified essential habitat by reducing the
prevalence of lobster, Greenpeace did not sufficiently prove that
the lobster was “absolutely critical” to the monk seal’s diet.87
Despite using traps, the lobster fishery did not physically harm
the seals.88 This broken link in the chain of causation impeded
the court’s ability to assign ESA liability. Although important to
the seal’s diet, the declining lobster population was not enough
to prove a violation of the “take” prohibition.
Portraying the dichotomy between direct and indirect
“takings,” the court in Greenpeace Foundation also examined the
commercial bottomfish operation. The court found that this
fishing method had accidentally killed several seals.89 Fishermen
83. Id. at 164-65.
84. See id. at 165.
85. See id.
86. See Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126-27 (D.
Haw. 2000). See generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 67, at 68-69
(discussing various cases in which scientific testimony either did or did not
establish causation chains).
87. Greenpeace Found., 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. To be “absolutely critical,”
the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the availability of lobster was the
difference between life and death for the seal. Id.
88. See id. at 1127, 1133.
89. See id. Seals were directly killed by this fishing operation when the seals
become entangled with the gear while trying to take the catch from the hooks.
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had also directly killed additional seals to prevent them from
stealing catch from lines.90 Contrary to the lobster fishery, the
court in this instance did not hesitate to find that both the
accidental and intentional killings were “takes” in violation of
the ESA.91 This case portrays Justice O’Connor’s spectrum of
proximate causation in the context of “take” liability. Although
entanglement in fishing lines was sufficient to prove causation,
establishing the more attenuated chain of causation to establish
the “take” of a protected species is more much problematic, such
as the allegations against the lobster fishery, even when founded
upon scientific data.
The Sweet Home decision subjected the proof of “take”
analysis to principles of proximate causation and foreseeability,
as seen by the holdings in Strahan and Greenpeace Foundation.
Although the standard is not required, a majority of courts
consider proximate causation in their reasoning.92 Courts should
continue to employ the common law framework, particularly in
ESA liability cases, because incorporating the proximate
causation standard functions “to prevent unfairness in attaching
liability.”93
From a liability perspective, proximate cause refers to the
reasonably anticipated consequences and intervening forces
between an activity and its alleged harm.94 Considering that as
of June 2015 the ESA lists over 2,200 plants and animals as
either threatened or endangered, with many more under
consideration for listing—proximate causation represents a

LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 67, at 70.
90. Greenpeace Found., 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
91. Id. at 1134-36. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 67, at 69-70.
92. See generally Glen & Douglas, supra note 67, at 132 (explaining that
strictly construing the Sweet Home rule has led most lower courts to require
plaintiffs to bear a heavy burden of proof); Steven Richardson et al., The Return
of Sweet Home in the Texas Whooping Crane Case, and a Sign that ESA Is on
Its Way to SCOTUS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENDANGERED SPECIES REP. (Aug.
2014), available at http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item5093.html (suggesting that although not every circuit has followed the Sweet
Home proximate causation analysis, including the 9th and 11th circuits,
Aransas Project may still be persuasive).
93. Fischman, supra note 4, at 685.
94. Id. at 688.
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critical safeguard for judges as they preside over future ESA
“take” litigation and the multifaceted chains of causation within
these cases.95
IV.
CHALLENGES WITH USING ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH AS SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE TO PROVE CAUSATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ESA
LIABILITY
Science, and the science of ecology, is not equivalent to truth.
Rather, science is a specialized language and method that we
employ to learn about truth (objective reality) and to explain
errors (arising from non-scientific, objectively false versions of
reality).96

A.

The Daubert Trilogy

The task of proving causation is an “inferential process,” such
that the trier of fact weighs evidence and concludes whether an
effect is the result of a particular stimulus.97 The interpretation
of scientific evidence complicates issues of causation—whereas
the Daubert trilogy dramatically altered the landscape of
incorporating expert scientific testimony to establish a sequence
of inferences, specifically with regard to questions of
admissibility.98 This article questions whether the Supreme
95. Summary of Listed Species, Listed Populations, and Recovery Plans as of
Wed, 17 Jun 2015 21:49:25 GMT, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.

fws.gov/tess_public/pub/boxScore.jsp (last visited June 17, 2015). The USFWS
protects over 480 endangered animals and 725 endangered plants, with even
more additional species receiving threatened species protections. Id. In fact, the
state of Texas alone is home to almost seventy listed animals. See Listed Species
Believed To or Known to Occur in Texas, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/reports/species-listed-by-state-report?state=TX&
status=listed (last updated Feb. 13, 2015).
96. Aaron M. Ellison, Statistics and Science, Objectivity and Truth:
Comments on Dennis, in THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL,
PHILOSOPHICAL, AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 363 (M.L. Taper & S.R. Lele
eds., 2004). Dr. Ellison is a Senior Research Fellow in Ecology with Harvard
University and is renowned in the fields of ecology and experimental statistics.
97. See Jerome P. Kassirer & Gladys Kessler, Preface, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE xiv (3d ed. 2011).
98. See Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in
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Court’s intention was to apply Daubert principles to all scientific
disciplines or just those disciplines encountered within the
Daubert trilogy. More precisely, perhaps the principles
expounded in Daubert should not apply in the same manner
across all scientific disciplines, particularly those not rooted in
traditional laboratory methodology.
The Daubert trilogy consists of three Supreme Court cases
relating to the evidentiary validity and reliability of expert
testimony.99 Each case disputed the issue of causation, though
the particular scientific disciplines involved were traditional
“hard” sciences (e.g., health sciences, clinical studies,
epidemiological studies, toxicology). In the trilogy’s seminal case,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court
enumerated a stringent test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.100 Further, the Court established basic principles to
guide trial judges in determining the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.101 The Court reasoned that trial courts have an
obligation to act as a gatekeeper by vetting the relevance and
reliability of expert testimony.102 As an underlying theme in
Daubert, the Court recognized the standard that “evidentiary
reliability will be based on scientific validity” when courts review
the testimony of scientific experts.103
According to Daubert, trial judges must ensure that the
substance of an expert’s testimony is entrenched in “scientific

REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 36 (3d ed. 2011); Kassirer &
Kessler, supra note 97, at xiii.
99. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Forensic DNA analyses, most certainly conducted in
laboratories, have also been subjected to the Daubert evidentiary standard. See
Berger, supra note 98, at 26.
100. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
101. See id. at 588, 591. FRE Rule 702 states:
“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
102. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
103. Id. at 590 n.9.
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knowledge.”104 To qualify as “scientific,” inferences must be
derivative of scientific methods and procedures.105 Conjunctively,
the term “knowledge” pertains to more than mere subjective
beliefs and unsupported speculation.106 The Court qualified this
interpretation, noting that validity of scientific testimony is not
an absolute, because “there are no certainties in science.”107
Although not a definitive test, Daubert enumerated several
considerations to determine whether an expert’s testimony is
validly rooted in scientific methodology.108 The Court
emphasized the empirical nature of science, such as the use of
hypotheses to examine the falsifiability, refutability, and
testability of a theory.109 As an additional indicator of “good
science,” the Court examined whether the theory has been
through the peer-reviewed publication process and subjected to
the scrutiny of the scientific community.110 Nevertheless,
scholars have expressed concern with Daubert’s “unduly
cramped” approach to the philosophy of science.111 Rather than
focusing on whether the expert witness may “assist” a lay person
in seeking the truth about their respective scientific discipline—
many courts have come to treat the Daubert considerations “not

104. Id. at 589-90.
105. Id. at 590.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 594-95 (describing the applicability of the factors, “The
inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one”).
109. Id. at 593.
110. See id. at 591-95 (considering whether the known or potential error
rates of the method are determined and whether standards exist to control the
techniques within the methodology). Another consideration is the “general
acceptance” of the technique within the relevant scientific community, although
this factor is no longer dispositive. In regards to scientific evidence, the Court
noted that it must relate to and fit with a fact at issue. Id.
111. David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). Crump
expressed concern that the Daubert test may unwisely exclude certain
renowned scientific experts: “[I]f the Court’s conception of science in Daubert
were to be applied according to its terms, Sir Isaac Newton probably would be
disqualified from testifying to a question within his competence. The opinions of
Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein likely would meet the same fate.” Id. at 2.
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as flexible criteria, but as technical hurdles, tests to be
rigorously surmounted.”112
Courts have traditionally considered Daubert principles in the
context of regimented laboratory sciences rather than field
sciences. In Daubert, the case focused on an alleged link between
a prescription drug and birth defects in children born to mothers’
who had ingested the pharmaceutical.113 Attempting to prove
causation, the plaintiffs’ experts sought to testify on findings
based on animal studies performed in the laboratory.114 The
experts also sought to testify about epidemiological studies and
chemical-structure analyses.115 In general, the science in
Daubert focused on laboratory experiments performed in
controlled situations with controlled variables. Because the
Court derived its considerations within the context of these
laboratory studies, it is unclear whether the Court considered
the applicability of the considerations in regards to the validity
of scientific testimony based on “soft” sciences, such as field
studies within the discipline of ecology.
In Daubert, the plaintiffs’ sought to prove the alleged link of
causation with scientific evidence derived from clinical and
laboratory studies. In comparison, ecological field studies are
often the focus when attempting to establish causation for
violations of the ESA’s “take” prohibition. Judges may not
recognize the distinctions between the laboratory science in
Daubert and ecological research, such as in the Aransas Project
and other ESA cases. Field research variables may be difficult to
identify, unlike controlled laboratory variables, because random
mechanisms and sampling schemes are often encountered in
nature. In fact, the scientific method is not precisely the same
across all disciplines of science.116 Because the Daubert ruling
focused on the admissibility of scientific testimony in products
liability litigation, the Court “did not discuss the relevance of its

Id. at 1-2.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
See Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert
and the Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 912, 920 (1994).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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analysis to the review of regulatory science[s],” such as
environmental sciences.117
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
emphasized his concern that the majority’s decision went beyond
the question presented, ruling on an area of law before it was
fully developed.118 Although Daubert principles have
encountered widespread acceptance, there are inherent
difficulties that arise when referring to the institution of science
generically, without any plausible limitations. According to the
Chief Justice, the duty of the judiciary is not “to become amateur
scientist[s].”119 He elaborated on this apprehension, “I defer to no
one in my confidence in federal judges, but I am at a loss to know
what is meant when it is said that the scientific status depends
on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”120
Scientific knowledge is dynamic, such that it changes as new
information becomes available. This is primarily because
scientific explanations are based on observations and
experiments and consequently can be substantiated by other
scientists.121 Issues with causation are manifest in the realm of
expert testimony, particularly when judges must determine the
evidentiary reliability of the testimony to assess the cause of
ecological injuries. Despite being familiar to experts, concepts of
scientific causation and statistical correlation may not resonate
with judges.122 This posits a dilemma when courts must decide
whether to assign liability on the merits of scientific data,
because “science does not reveal the truth, so much as produce

117. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the
Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1138

(1994). Tarlock describes “regulatory science” as an applied science that
promotes an interdisciplinary approach, relevant here because it encompasses
research involving ecology, conservation biology, and other environmental
sciences. See id. at 1138-39.
118. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 600-01.
120. Id. at 600. Judges may be in a less favorable position to make causal
assessments than scientists—because judges make causation rulings based on
existing information—whereas scientists, based on the availability of data, may
delay in making conclusions. See Kassirer & Kessler, supra note 97, at xiv.
121. See Buck et al., supra note 44, at 152-53.
122. See Kassirer & Kessler, supra note 97, at xiii-xvi.
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the best available or most likely explanation of natural
phenomena, given the information available at the time.”123
District courts have great discretion in determining the
validity of evidence from different scientific disciplines,
prompting inconsistencies with how courts handle proof of
causation.124 Judge Alex Kozinski, while presiding on Daubert’s
remand to the Ninth Circuit, expressed his concern with the task
assigned to federal judges with regard to scientific testimony:
Our responsibility, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court’s opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, wellcredentialed scientists about matters squarely within their
expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to
what is and what is not ‘good science,’ and occasionally to
reject such expert testimony because it was not ‘derived by the
scientific method’ . . . [W]e take a deep breath and proceed with
this heady task.125

Judge Kozinski’s hesitation, though directly referring to the
clinical trials in Daubert, is even more concerning in the context
of reviewing ecological testimony. This concern is magnified
when coupled with the notion that any scientific consensus
regarding a given theory is in perpetual fluidity; thus, the
fundamental differences among the various scientific disciplines
amplify the challenges associated with reconciling science and
the law.
Examining the role of science in the courtroom, Justice
Stephen Breyer proclaimed, “A judge is not a scientist, and a
courtroom is not a scientific laboratory.”126 Although various
issues proliferate from this declaration, Justice Breyer’s use of
the term “laboratory” suggests that controlled experiments
within the realm of “hard” sciences were the origin of the
Daubert principles, rather than ecological studies and other
“soft” sciences.

123. Buck et al., supra note 44, at 153 (emphasis added).
124. See Berger, supra note 98, at 24-25.
125. Id. at 52 n.20 (citing Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316).
126. Stephen Breyer, Introduction, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 4 (3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added).
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This distinction is important because “hard” sciences, such as
chemistry and toxicology, maintain fundamentally different
methodologies and assumptions than those in ecological studies.
Specifically, “controlled experiments of chemistry and toxicology
provide a different set of challenges for integrating information
into law than do the ecological issues associated with
conservation biology.”127 According to some scholars, Daubert
raised the possibility that conservation biology and other “soft”
sciences may be unacceptable as a basis for deciding
causation.128
Ecologists face complexities and unpredictable natural forces
when analyzing causation in the environment. This underscores
the significance of using proximate causation in conjunction with
judicial reliance on scientific experts, particularly when
assigning ESA liability based on ecological testimony. Proximate
causation is a necessary restraint when courts apply Daubert
principles in their review of ecological testimony within the
context of proving violations of the “take” prohibition, primarily
because the principles in Daubert may be better suited to
evaluate the admissibility of laboratory sciences.

Challenges Associated with Proving Ecological Injuries in
the Daubert Context

B.
1.

“Hard” Science vs. “Soft” Science

Daubert presents challenges when reviewing the reliability of
ecological data as scientific evidence. Trial judges are not
“supposed to make global judgments about either a discipline or
all of an expert’s theories,” but rather the court should direct its
focus on “the task at hand.”129 Instead, as scholars suggest, the

127. Fischman, supra note 4, at 661 (noting that the assumptions and
uncertainties of applied science compound the already difficult task of
determining how human activities translate into environmental impacts).
128. Tarlock, supra note 117, at 1138.
129. Crump, supra note 111, at 25-26; see generally D. Michael Risinger,
Defining the “Task at Hand”: Nonscientific Science after Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 772 (2000) (discussing how the
Federal Rules of Evidence square with Daubert’s holding with regards to both
“non-science” and “clinical” claims).
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“reverberating clang” of Daubert’s specifically enumerated
considerations have the tendency to “drown[] everything else
out.”130 Because Daubert did not consider the applicability of its
considerations in the context of non-laboratory sciences like
ecology, the differences between “hard” and “soft” sciences
underscore the complications presented to courts.
Amplifying the distinction between “hard” and “soft” scientific
disciplines are the fundamental challenges that scientists
themselves face in proving the cause and effect of an ecological
injury. As the Aransas Project litigation illustrates, perhaps
courts should approach ecological data with caution, especially
with regard to the ESA’s “take” prohibition.
Jared Diamond, prominent author and scientist, scrutinized
the intrinsic differences between “hard” and “soft” sciences.131
Representing the minority of scientists who have researched in
both “hard” and “soft” scientific disciplines, Diamond offers a
unique perspective. According to Diamond, the complex
variability of “soft” sciences makes the field of ecology, “one of
the softer of the biological sciences” and more difficult to study
than “hard” sciences.132
“Hard” sciences, such as chemistry and molecular biology,
utilize evidence provided by “controlled, repeatable experiments”
130. Crump, supra note 111, at 26.
131. Jared Diamond, Opinion, Soft Sciences Are Often Harder than Hard
Sciences, DISCOVER 34, Aug. 1987 [hereinafter Diamond, Soft Sciences]. The
subject of Diamond’s opinion letter disputed a colleagues’ induction (or lack
thereof) into the National Academy of Sciences because of the sentiment
between “hard” or “soft” scientists. Although he is a noted scientist who
received a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, Diamond is best known for
authoring transcendent popular science books, such as Guns, Germs and Steel:

The Fates of Human Societies and Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or
Succeed, as well as a host of articles in well-respected peer-review journals.
Diamond is uniquely qualified to discuss the differences because of his
experiences in various scientific disciplines, including anthropology, ecology,
geography, evolutionary biology, ornithology, and physiology. See generally
Jared
Diamond,
Further
Reading,
JARED
DIAMOND,
http://www.jareddiamond.org/Jared_Diamond/Further_Reading.html
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2015); Jared Diamond, My Books, JARED DIAMOND,
http://www.jareddiamond.org/Jared_Diamond/My_Books.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2015) (highlighting a selection of books and articles by Diamond which may
be of interest to those so inclined).
132. Diamond, Soft Sciences, supra note 131, at 35, 38.
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in the laboratory.133 Based on well-understood assumptions,
“hard” sciences often yield “high[ly] accurate measurements.”134
“Hard” sciences comport to traditional stereotypes, invoking
images of science confined to the laboratory, with researchers
donned in white coats and holding test tubes.135
On the contrary, “soft” sciences, such as ecology and other
observational field studies, are theoretically more difficult to
research. They “can’t be measured to several decimal places in
labs,” primarily because “the world is full of phenomena that are
intellectually challenging.”136 Presumably, courts may also
struggle to understand the differences between “hard” and “soft”
sciences in the context of ESA cases, particularly when
reviewing ecological testimony to establish chains of causation.
The dichotomy between laboratory and field research is
evident when scientists examine specific variables within a
study. Laboratory research has predetermined sample sizes and
known variables, and readily lends itself to scientific hypotheses.
In stark contrast, ecological research, generally conducted in
nature, challenges researchers: “You can’t start it and stop it
whenever you choose. You can’t control all the variables; perhaps
you can’t control any variable. You may even find it hard to
decide what a variable is.”137
These differences are often misunderstood by scientists
themselves, suggesting that courtroom debate is an inefficient
platform to settle this contention. Even statistical models do not
fully describe the random mechanisms and sampling schemes
encountered in nature.138 Especially in the Daubert context,
testing an ecology hypothesis is challenging because non-

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See generally Brian Dennis, Statistics and the Scientific Method in
Ecology, in THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

PHILOSOPHICAL, AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 347-49 (M.L. Taper & S.R.
Lele eds., 2004) (observing that a primary principle in Bayesian statistics is that
“sample space probabilities are irrelevant to inferences about unknown
parameters”).
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standard data routinely confronts researchers, as populations
rarely follow patterns of normal distribution.139
The scientific discipline of ecology accounts for “the
relationships between organisms and their past, present, and
future environments. These relationships include physiological
responses of individuals, structure and dynamics of populations,
interactions among species, organization of biological
communities, and processing of energy and matter in
ecosystems.” 140 More precisely, an understanding of ecology
allows scientists to comprehend the mosaic of factors that
influence a species’ interaction with the physical environment.141
Through observational studies, ecologists can examine situations
in which nature is allowed to take its course without interference
or laboratory manipulations by the ecologist. Ecology is broader
than most other sub-disciplines of biology because it necessarily
evaluates the interaction between multiple groups of organisms
and various elements of their physical environment.142
In comparison, researchers directly control the conditions and
variables within experimental studies conducted in the
laboratory.143 Because the predictive nature of science
emphasizes the probability of various outcomes rather than
absolute certainty, the complexity and risk associated with
assigning ESA liability can frustrate the interaction between
scientists and courts.144 Although founded upon “elegant
hypothesis construction and testing,” otherwise valid scientific
research may actually be insufficient “to provide the necessary

139. See id. at 350-54.
140. DOUB, supra note 1, at 17-18 (citing About ESA, ECOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF
AM., http://www.esa.org/esa/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015)).
141. Id. at 19 (arguing that successful preservation of endangered species
requires keeping species in their natural surroundings and thus, an
understanding of ecology).
142. See id. (arguing that ecology is perhaps broader than scientific
disciplines concerned with either, specific taxa (e.g., zoology, botany,
entomology, microbiology) or disciplines concerned with specific elements of
these organisms (e.g., anatomy, cell biology, biochemistry, physiology).
143. See generally Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis,
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 623 (3d ed. 2011) (defining experimental study).
144. See Buck et al., supra note 44, at 155.
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information and thus, the rational guidance for scientifically
sound decision making.”145
Consequently, the Supreme Court may not have fully
considered the complexities of “soft” sciences or field research
when they first employed the Daubert principles in the context of
scientific testimony. Rather than assigning judges with the
responsibility of “determining the validity of a scientific theory
as a kind of amateur scientist,” some scholars advocate for a
return to Rule 702’s “helpfulness” or “assist” standard in regards
to the review of expert testimony.146 In the context of complex
ecological injuries, perhaps it would benefit trial judges to assess
these situations under the guidance of established legal
principles, such as proximate causation.
2.

Complexities of Ecological Field Research Compared with
Laboratory Methodology

Although scientific disciplines share similar attributes,
including hypothesis testing and empirical data, it is essential to
highlight the unique complexities of the respective disciplines.
Within the realm of expert testimony, courts must consider the
inherent principles of ecological research.
In an article reviewing the prevailing data gaps between
science and the law, Professor Robert L. Fischman remarked, “If
Einstein was correct that God does not play dice with the
universe, then an understanding of modern ecology recruits the
divine spirit for some other game of chance.”147 This ecological
paradigm is defined by the realization that because “nature
operates stochastically,” it is rooted in unpredictable and random
forces.148
Redressing ecological injuries within the parameters of the
law is difficult, particularly because regulatory schemes for
environmental protection focus on the cause and effect of these
injuries.149 Richard J. Lazarus, noted environmental law scholar

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Tarlock, supra note 117, at 1133.
Crump, supra note 111, at 41.
Fischman, supra note 4, at 685.

Id.
See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About
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and professor of law, articulated the challenges that permeate
the conflict between ecological injuries and a legal regime
addressing these injuries.150 The environment, shared by many
cohabitating species, is subject to “many simultaneous and
sporadic actions over time and space.”151
Difficulties arise when seeking to prove causation, because
environmental harm is dynamic and not static, as the severity of
the harm often increases over time.152 Because nature is not
confined to a laboratory, “[a]ctions in one location may have
substantial adverse effects in very distant locations.”153 The
cause and effect of an ecological injury may be physically
distant.154 Further compounding these spatial challenges,
ecological injuries may also be temporally distant.155 This lack of
imminence may prevent an injury from being fully-realized until
some point in the distant future.156
The uncertainty that permeates ecological injuries,
influencing both cause and effect, is perhaps the most
fundamental challenge associated with proving environmental
harm in court.157 Expounding on the root of these difficulties,
Professor Lazarus explains: “The primary source of this
Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703, 745 (2000).
150. See id. at 745-48 (discussing six features of typical ecological injuries

that pose challenges to lawmakers and highlighting the dichotomy between
science and the law as part of a larger article reviewing the Supreme Court’s
approach to Environmental Law, including the ESA). The features Professor
Lazarus discusses include: Irreversible, Catastrophic, and Continuing Injury;
Physically Distant Injury; Temporally Distant Injury; Uncertainty and Risk;
Multiple Causes; and Noneconomic, Nonhuman Character. Id.
151. Id. at 747.
152. See id. at 745 (expressing concern with “legal regimes that are
inherently cautious and slow to react,” because they “do not readily lend
themselves to the quick action often necessary in the ecological context.”).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 746. Legal scholars debate the interaction between present and
future harm in an environmental harm setting. Lazarus references an article by
Lisa Heinzerling, postulating that “interaction works in both directions: the
future reaches into the present, and the present into the future.” Id. at 746
n.229 (citing Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future , 87
GEO. L.J. 2025, 2026 (1999)).
156. Id. at 746.
157. See id. at 747.
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uncertainty is the sheer complexity of the natural environment
and, accordingly, how much is still unknown about it.”158 This
uncertainty makes it difficult for judges to assign liability for
environmental harm on several fronts.
With regard to the doctrinal importance of foreseeability,
“uncertainty expresses itself in our inability to know beforehand
the environmental impact of certain actions.”159 Even more
substantial, “[i]t equally undermines our ability to apprehend,
after the fact, what precisely caused certain environmental
impacts,” a feature that further compounds the challenges that
judges face when considering scientific testimony in the ESA
context.160
Similarly, Professor Fischman also recognized the pervading
conflict between courts and ecology, particularly with regard to
notions of scientific uncertainty. He explained, “the best we can
do about predicting outcomes or explaining occurrences is to
describe relative likelihoods.”161 The notion that science is
uncertain, and not just an aggregation of unconnected facts, both
complicates and foreshadows the overarching conflict between
science and proximate cause.162
The mechanisms that influence ecosystem productivity further
compound the difficulty in proving causation for long-term
ecological injuries. Although complex, natural systems share a
dynamic connection in the sense that any changes may result in
cascading impacts felt throughout the ecosystem.163 For instance,
shifts in resource availability present a challenge to scientists
because proving causation can be problematic “due to lack of

158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Fischman, supra note 4, at 685.
162. See generally Buck et al., supra note 44, at 156-57 (examining how a
scientist’s personal values or the influence of interest groups may threaten the
objectivity of science by extrapolating from the cases of Wisconsin’s
yellowthroats and the snail darter).
163. See Sanne H. Knudsen, The Long-Term Tort: In Search of a New
Causation Framework for Natural Resources Damages, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 475,
492 (2014) (describing the natural variations within a population that are
driven by any number of dynamic influences within an ecosystem).
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baseline data, natural variability, and problems of multiple
stressors and multiple sources.”164
From the perspective of the dynamic ecosystem at issue in the
Aransas Project litigation, it is important to note that ecological
injuries are often rooted in multiple causes; a truism that is
especially relevant when assigning liability to a singular entity.
Because these injuries are “rarely the product of a single action
at an isolated moment in time,” challenges pertaining to
equitable decision-making abound when judges base their
determinations solely on science, rather than consulting the
established legal principles of proximate cause.165
Proving causation is especially problematic because ecological
food chains are inherently attenuated, such as the whooping
crane - blue crab nexus described in Aransas Project. As energy
transfers sequentially between different trophic levels, it does so
in the presence of multiple interconnected food chains.166 The
intrinsic complexities of the natural system illuminate the fact
that endangered species are not isolated from the potential
indirect effects of various sources.167
Relying solely on scientific testimony may further complicate
the task of proving causation, primarily because species are in
constant competition for food, resources, and space.168 When
judges look to scientific evidence to prove ecological injuries, they
may not fully consider that “environmental harms are more
typically the cumulative and synergistic result of multiple
actions, often spread over significant time and space.”169

164. Id.
165. Lazarus, supra note 149, at 747.
166. See DOUB, supra note 1, at 19.
167. See id. Characterizing food webs as numerous interconnected terrestrial
and aquatic food chains that are generally operating within any natural setting,
Doub describes the interaction between species at varying trophic levels:
“[Plants and other photosynthetic organisms [producers] convert energy from
the sun into biological tissue that can be used as food by other organisms
[consumers]. Progressively larger consumer organisms then feed on smaller
organisms through sequential stages referred to as trophic levels.” Id.
168. Id.
169. Lazarus, supra note 149, at 747.
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Dr. R. Douglas Slack, testifying as an expert scientific witness
in Aransas Project, described the challenges associated with
incorporating science into the courtroom:
But science advances. Science is not static. [We] may have a
conclusion in one study at one time, but as we move forward
and advance our knowledge of an ecosystem, that’s going to
change. And, so, I may be guilty of moving forward in science
and changing my conclusions.170

Dr. Slack’s quote underscores the dichotomy between science
and law, which should serve to caution legal regimes that choose
to overlook established proximate causation jurisprudence solely
in favor of scientific testimony, particularly when assigning
liability for violations of the “take” prohibition.
In general, science involves the construction of convincing
explanations through the acquisition of reliable knowledge.171 As
debate throughout the scientific community ensues on a
particular theory, not all testimony may be fundamentally
neutral or rooted in objectivity.172 The debate among
credentialed ecologists is contentious, as limited funds for
research are often controlled by agencies with agendas.173
Scientists often have personal values that influence (consciously
or unconsciously) their questions, their assumptions, and the
interpretation of their experimental results.174 These individuals
work for various state and federal agencies, companies, research
institutions, and other public interest groups.175 As a result,

170. Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, R. Douglas
Slack, Ph.D. at 233, Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No.
CA-C-10-075), 2011 WL 10904317.
171. See generally Dennis, supra note 138, at 349-52 (highlighting the case
of Bayesian statistical analysis as one such instance of this phenomenon).
172. See id. at 329-30 (observing that ecological research is often funded by
parties with agendas). A hypothesis provides a tentative statement that can be
tested, whereas a theory is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of
observable reality that can incorporate facts, inferences, and tested hypotheses.
See id. at 330.
173. See id. at 329 (observing that ecology “has become a highly politicized
science”).
174. See Buck et al., supra note 44, at 156-57.
175. Id.
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vigorous scientific debate and underlying personal biases may be
difficult for courts to assess.
C.

Complications with Using Science to Prove Causation for
Ecological Injuries in the ESA Context

An underlying tension between science and the law permeates
the ESA, “from which a ‘law-science’ decision-making process
emerges, befuddling to lawyers and scientists alike.”176 The
common law’s judicial principles, rooted in linear models of cause
and effect, may not adequately comprehend the complex and
erratic characteristics of nature.177
Predictably, courts face a dilemma because “the common law
concept of proximate causation fails to jibe with the way nature
works.”178 Although this statement might suggest that courts
should shift to incorporate more science when considering ESA
liability, this reasoning emphasizes precisely the opposite. It
instead proposes that perhaps we ask courts to do too much with
regard to scientific comprehension within the courtroom.
Because judges are experts in the field of law, it is unrealistic to
require them to look beyond their legal expertise in an effort to
understand the complex mechanisms of nature.
Requiring judges to reach the same level of understanding as
an established scientist during a week-long bench trial is not
only impractical, but may also lead to inequitable results.
Uncertainty and multiple causes permeate ecological injuries,
further supporting the reason why courts should continue to use
proximate cause as a limit when reviewing scientific testimony,
especially in the context of the “take” prohibition.
Aside from requiring all judges to obtain doctoral degrees in
ecology if they wish to hear ESA cases, perhaps it is correct to
rely upon Justice O’Connor’s tort principles as an overarching

176. Ruhl, supra note 64, at 514.
177. See generally Fischman, supra note 4, at 685 (explaining that the
“current ecological paradigm is that nature operates stochastically”). “Another
powerful argument recommending proximate cause is that, as a common law
concept, it is well tested by far more cases than will ever be brought under the
ESA.” Id. at 688.
178. Id. at 686.
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safeguard.179 Although some scholars disagree, additional
commentators suggest that courts should continue to borrow
from the common law by applying proximate cause principles
when resolving disputes regarding the “take” prohibition.180
Scientists make predictions based on the probability of an
aggregated behavior occurring within an ecosystem; yet the
exact same ecosystem may still “defy identification of direct
cause-effect for their components.”181 Despite the difficulties
encountered by scientists in proving causation within their own
respective research, some scholars nevertheless continue to
advocate against incorporating tort principles into the take
analysis.182
Seemingly, this uncertainty makes it more difficult to prove
causation. “What is easily foreseeable to those with a modicum of
training in natural history may not be foreseeable to those who
hold widely prevalent, but erroneous, views of ecology and

179. Obtaining a Ph.D. in science, particularly in ecology, requires a
substantial commitment. Degrees often take five to six years to complete,
require defenses of dissertations, multiple publications, oral examinations,
teaching courses, and years of field research. This is generally after completing
a two to three-year master’s degree and a four-year undergraduate degree
concentrated in science. See generally Walter P. Carson, A Primer on How to

Apply to and Get Admitted to Graduate School in Ecology and Evolutionary
Biology, ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, http://www.esa.org/esa/educationand-diversity/ecology-as-a-career-2/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (outlining
requirements and recommendations to pursue graduate studies in ecology).
180. See Fischman, supra note 4, at 686. See generally Paul Boudreaux,
Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 734
(2002) (arguing that courts should use common law precedent in interpreting
the ESA); See Steven P. Quarles, John A. MacLeod & Thomas R. Lundquist,
Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife “Take” Under Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003, 10,004-12 (1996) (analyzing
the effects of Sweet Home on subsequent ESA applications, and questioning the
range of cases, in light Sweet Home’s focus on proximate cause, where habitat
modification violates the “take” prohibition); James R. Rasband, Priority,

Probability, and Proximate Cause Lessons from Tort Law about Imposing ESA
Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat
Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 613-14 (2003) (explaining that although
courts are incorporating Justice O’Connor’s standard with more frequency,
“there remains significant uncertainty about the extent of behavioral
impairment necessary to show harm,” particularly at the population-level).
181. Fischman, supra note 4, at 685.
182. See Ruhl, supra note 64, at 502.
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animal behavior.”183 This proposition echoes Justice Breyer’s
aforementioned reluctance to turn the courtroom into a scientific
laboratory. More precisely, determining whether the cause and
effect are foreseeable “will depend upon the judge’s scientific
understanding of the direct relationship between species
survival and habitat preservation . . . both in the abstract and in
the context of a particular case.”184 This propensity to obscure
the role of the judiciary reflects the importance in letting courts
rule on established legal principles, rather than complicated
scientific theories.
The pervading tension between the limits of science and the
standards of proximate causation has been an enduring problem
in environmental law.185 According to prominent legal
scholarship, the Supreme Court’s “lack of deep understanding of
ecological processes” explains the ESA’s fall from grace within
the purview of the Court.186
The challenges faced by our country’s greatest legal minds,
especially concerning ecological uncertainties, underscores the
practical benefits of proximate cause in relation to the ESA’s
“take” prohibition. While advocating against proximate cause in
the ESA context, scholars have noted that scientists “do not
think like tort lawyers.”187 While accurate, this statement fails to
appreciate the fact that judges are in fact better equipped to
think like tort lawyers—even if scientists are not.
Given the consequences associated with assigning ESA
liability, maintaining proximate causation as a consistent

183. Ruhl, supra note 64, at 502 n.96 (quoting MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE
J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 216 (3d ed., 1997)).
184. Branden L. Jensen, Litigating the Crossroads Between Sweet Home
and Daubert, 24 VT. L. REV. 169, 179 n.69 (1999) (quoting Tara L. Mueller,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities: When is Habitat Modification
a Take?, 3 W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 333, 338 (1996)).
185. See Tarlock, supra note 117, at 1133 (explaining that “[t]he research
may be scientifically valid, but it may lack the cross-disciplinary integration and
informed speculation needed to be useful to a policy maker”).
186. Ruhl, supra note 64, at 513. See generally Lazarus, supra note 149, at
744-71 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s treatment of environmental cases
shows a lack of consideration for, and understanding of, the unique character of
environmental injuries).
187. Ruhl, supra note 64, at 513-14.
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threshold will prevent the courtroom from becoming an
inappropriate arena for scientific debate.
V.
THE ARANSAS PROJECT V. SHAW LITIGATION
A.

District Court’s Reliance on Expert Scientific Testimony

TAP sought to enjoin TCEQ’s licensing for surface water
withdrawals from the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers as an
alleged violation of the ESA.188 TAP’s allegations focused on the
reduced freshwater inflow entering the Guadalupe Estuary, that
when coupled with local drought conditions, increased the
salinity of the bay.189
TAP argued that the increasing salinities reduced the
abundance of the whooping cranes primary diet food resources,
specifically blue crabs and wolfberries.190 Because of the reduced
prey abundance, TAP argued that this prompted cranes to
engage in stress behavior, leading to emaciation and the deaths
of twenty-three cranes during the winter of 2008-09.191
Contending that TCEQ violated the ESA, TAP sought injunctive
relief to ensure that the flock would have sufficient water
resources to prevent future “takes.”192
The court reasoned that TCEQ’s actions and inactions caused
an unlawful “take” of at least twenty-three whooping cranes.193
Accordingly, it enjoined the TCEQ from approving or granting
new water withdrawal permits from the Guadalupe or San

188. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 725-26 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
189. Id. at 725.
190. Id.
191. Id. Dr. Chavez-Ramirez testified that “a lack of adequate food and
drinkable water in the territories can cause the [Aransas-Wood Buffalo] cranes
to leave and fly to the uplands to locate freshwater ponds.” Id. at 766.
192. See id. at 726.
193. See generally id. at 780-88 (holding that TCEQ’s diversion of freshwater
flow resulted in increased salinity in the bay and ultimately caused the take of
at least twenty-three whooping cranes in violation of the ESA).
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Antonio Rivers until the State determined that the issuance of
these water permits would not violate the ESA.194
TCEQ was liable for the “take” of whooping cranes because
their water management practices altered the salinity of the
cranes’ critical habitat in the Guadalupe estuary.195 According to
the district court, scientific testimony demonstrated that TCEQ’s
water management practices caused the “take” of whooping
cranes by “altering their behavior through habitat modification,
depriving them of food and water resources, and ultimately,
leading to malnourishment and death.”196
Although the court acknowledged that “[o]rdinary
requirements of proximate causation apply to ESA cases,” this
important aspect of ESA “take” jurisprudence was notably
absent from the court’s in-depth analysis.197 Quite succinctly, the
court simply noted that an activity authorized by a government
agency satisfies the proximate causation standard when it
causes the “take” of endangered species.198
The court did not consider concepts of remoteness,
attenuation, foreseeability, or the natural and probable
consequences of actions.199 Without further consideration, it only
briefly mentioned Justice O’Connor’s proximate causation
standard, “[T]he Court finds that the actions, inactions and
refusal to act by the TCEQ defendants proximately caused an

194. Id. at 789. The district court required the TCEQ to seek an Incidental
Take Permit to lead to the development of a Habitat Conservation Plan
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Id. The court also awarded TAP, the prevailing
party, to its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as well as expert witness fees
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4). Id.
195. Id. at 780.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 786. The district court cited Justice O’Connor’s Sweet Home
concurrence, though without a detailed proximate causation analysis. Id. at 727.
198. Id. at 786 (citing Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 978-79 (D. Mass.
1996) and Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., 148 F.3d
1231,1247-53 (11th Cir. 1998)). The court did analyze “but-for” causation: “Butfor the regulatory and permitting scheme overseen by the TCEQ defendants, no
state-owned water could be legally diverted, impounded or consumed.” Id.
199. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 818 (5th Cir. 2014).
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unlawful take of at least twenty-three Whooping Cranes in the
2008-09 winter in violation of the ESA.”200
Rather than adhering to Justice O’Connor’s proximate
causation standard, the court’s finding of ESA liability instead
focused on its assessment of the expert scientific testimony
offered by both parties. The court focused its review of each
expert’s credibility through the lens of their respective careers
and accolades—rather than the scientist’s precise contribution
towards potentially understanding the chain of causation at
issue.201 Although the court did examine the science in extensive
detail, it reviewed each inferential step in isolation, rather than
in the context of a dynamic ecosystem with multiple factors
contributing to cause the “take” of the whooping cranes.202 As the
Fifth Circuit suggested in its reversal, the issue was with
foreseeability and not with the number of steps in the chain of
causation, as the lower court failed to “establish that the state
could have reasonably anticipated the synergy among the links
on the chain in 2008-09.”203
Acting as the “gatekeeper” for the admissibility of scientific
testimony, the court found all of TAP’s experts to be credible.204
In assessing the credibility of expert testimony, it generally
focused on the considerations put forth in Daubert, especially
when reviewing TAP’s experts.
The court noted that the TAP experts were credible, worldrenowned, and all had published numerous scientific papers in
respected journals.205 In contrast, it did not find credibility in the
scientific methodology of the defendants’ experts, expressing
concern because they “had limited experience and insignificant
knowledge of whooping cranes.”206 The court’s disapproval of
TCEQ’s experts was contrasted by its review of TAP’s experts,

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
See id. at 744-45.
See id. at 744-75.
Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d at 821.
See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
Id.
Id.
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particularly by the court’s unsubstantiated disparagement of Dr.
R. Douglas Slack, as will be analyzed below.207
1.

Inconsistent Review of Expert Scientists

TAP presented ten expert witnesses during the bench trial,
some of whom were “world renowned in their respective
fields.”208 The court primarily focused on the accolades of TAP’s
experts to determine their expertise and credibility.
Concentrating on the accomplishments of TAP’s experts, the
court found credence in the fact that some TAP experts held
“endowed chairs at prestigious universities, some are MacArthur
Fellows, all have published numerous scientific papers in
respected journals,” even noting that one TAP expert was a
Nobel Peace Prize recipient for his environmental work.209
The court specifically celebrated TAP’s whooping crane
experts, Dr. Felipe Chavez-Ramirez and refuge biologist Mr.
Tom Stehn, for their years of field-work and devotion to the
survival of the whooping crane.210 Additionally, the court
described these scientists as “leading authorities in their fields of
biology, ornithology, and whooping cranes in particular.”211
The court’s positive view of TAP’s experts is in stark contrast
to its opinion of TCEQ’s experts, and the court found an
“alarming trend in the experts that [defendants] offered.”212 It

207. See id. After teaching for almost four decades, Dr. Slack retired in 2011
from his position at Texas A&M as a wildlife and fisheries sciences professor
after a prestigious career that included sixty peer-reviewed publications and
countless research presentations. Dr. Slack’s credentials include numerous
grants to research Texas ecosystems, including a $1.4 million grant in 2002 to
study the relationship between freshwater inflows and whooping cranes. He
currently serves as Executive Director of the Texas Chapter of the Wildlife
Society. See Court Filed Expert Resume, R. Douglas Slack, Aransas Project I,
930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013), 2011 WL 10634582. See also Beloved
A&M Professor Gives Final Lesson, BRYAN- COLLEGE STATION EAGLE (May 2,
2011, 12:00 am), http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/beloved-a-m-professorgives-final-lesson/article_c7ee9091-3168-5e24-a7c6-de1bc57b731f.html.
208. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 744, 756-57.
211. Id. at 756-57.
212. Id. at 744 (describing the knowledge of TCEQ’s experts, regarding the
topic of whooping cranes, as “limited” and “insignificant”).
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did not afford the extensive resumes of the state’s experts with
the same deference it gave to TAP’s experts. Instead, it criticized
the defendant’s methodology, seemingly looking beyond the same
considerations that it used to analyze TAP’s experts, such as
experience and publication record.213
The court discredited Dr. Slack’s expertise as it pertained to
the chain of causation at issue in the case, despite his illustrious
research career and direct connection to the study of whooping
cranes.214
Although the court generally strayed from the Daubert
considerations that it focused on to determine the credibility of
TAP’s experts, the court instead analyzed the scientific
methodology employed in the defendants’ research. This lack of
consistency, even based on these unique circumstances, displays
the challenges that judges face when entering the complex and
uncertain arena of ecological injuries. The court took issue with
the evidentiary reliability of a report designed by Dr. Slack. It
questioned the methodology of Dr. Slack’s report because it used
data gathered by one of his graduate students, rather than a
specific report compiled by TAP’s experts, Dr. Chavez-Ramirez
and Mr. Stehn.215
The court praised Dr. Chavez-Ramirez for his extensive
experience as one of the foremost whooping crane ecologists and
for his substantial publication record. While Dr. Chavez-Ramirez
is unquestionably an expert on the subject, the court did not find
it important that he studied under Dr. Slack while in graduate
school.216 In fact, Dr. Chavez-Ramirez received both his Master

213. See id. at 744-45, 753-54, 767-69.
214. See Court Filed Expert Resume, R. Douglas Slack, supra note 207. In
particular, the court soundly criticized the expertise of Dr. Slack, an experienced
ecologist who suffers from Parkinson’s and diabetes, because of a single
misinterpreted statement that he made towards the end of his intensive and
lengthy cross-examination. Transcript of Testimony Of Defendant’s Expert
Witness, R. Douglas Slack, Ph.D., supra note 170, at 75-76.
215. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
216. See Court Filed Expert Resume, R. Douglas Slack, supra note 207. With
Dr. Slack as his advisor, Dr. Chavez-Ramirez completed both his Ph.D. in 1996
and M.S. in 1992 at Texas A&M University. Dr. Chavez-Ramirez was not Dr.
Slack’s first graduate student to research whooping cranes. In 1987, under Dr.
Slack, Howard Hunt completed a Ph.D. dissertation on whooping cranes in the
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of Science and Ph.D. in wildlife ecology under the guidance of Dr.
Slack.217 For almost a decade, Dr. Slack served as Dr. ChavezRamirez’s advisor.218 Dr. Chavez-Ramirez’s doctoral research
focused on the food availability, foraging ecology, and energetics
of whooping cranes, suggesting that both he and Dr. Slack
possess relatively similar expertise on the species.219 Dr. Slack
and Dr. Chavez-Ramirez co-authored at least eight publications
together in peer-reviewed journals, with two articles specifically
focused on whooping cranes.220 In total, Dr. Slack has coauthored at least nine papers in peer-reviewed journals on
whooping cranes, an extensive record that certainly indicates his
scientific knowledge regarding the species.221
Scientists publish many studies in peer-reviewed journals,
however. Publication record alone is not the basis of an
individual scientist’s ability to comprehend the subject at issue.
Studies may be completed over different periods of time, involve
multiple co-authors, and are cited at different rates based on
Aransas National Wildlife Refuge. See Transcript of Testimony Of Defendant’s
Expert Witness, R. Douglas Slack, Ph.D., supra note 170, at 85.
217. See Transcript of Testimony Of Defendant’s Expert Witness, R. Douglas
Slack, Ph.D., supra note 170, at 83-84.
218. In 1992, with research that began in 1989, Dr. Chavez-Ramirez
received his Master’s degree while researching as part of Dr. Slack’s laboratory
at Texas A&M. Felipe Chavez-Ramirez, Food Availability, Foraging Ecology,
and Energetics of Whooping Cranes Wintering in Texas (May 1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A&M University) (on file with ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses). In 1996, Dr. Chavez-Ramirez received his Ph.D.
under Dr. Slack’s tutelage, while Dr. Slack sat as the Chair of the Dissertation
Committee. As his advisor, presumably Dr. Slack also garnered significant
knowledge regarding the ecology of whooping cranes. Dr. Chavez-Ramirez
offered sincere gratitude towards Dr. Slack’s tutelage in his acknowledgements:
“My advisor, R. Doug Slack, provided extensive support and helpful discussions
on different aspects of my field work and during the writing of this dissertation.
I will always be grateful to Doug for the confidence that he showed in my ability
and the opportunity to conduct this research.” Id.
219. See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 757. As of 2013, Dr. ChavezRamirez works Gulf Coast Bird Observatory in Lake Jackson, Texas and is also
a member of the International Whooping Crane Recovery Team. Id.
220. See Court Filed Expert Resume, R. Douglas Slack, supra note 207, at
84.
221. See id. at 82. The number of publications on the topic of whooping
cranes was determined by enumerating from the publications that specifically
referenced whooping cranes in Dr. Slack’s resume filed with the court.
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particular disciplines. Therefore, solely examining the number of
publications may not be the most efficient approach to establish
the credibility of experts.
Although the court reviewed the methodology in some
instances, the deference afforded to the ecological testimony was
mainly a product of the expert’s reputation, rather than its legal
significance with regards to “the task at hand.”
2.

The Notorious Blue Crab Debate

Perhaps the most important links in the causation chain were
allegations that blue crab abundance declined because of
decreased freshwater inflow.222 The Court’s opinion concerning
the relevance of TCEQ expert Dr. Thomas Miller is particularly
interesting, considering he is a definitive expert on blue crab
ecology.
As director of Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, Dr. Miller’s
research centered on blue crab ecology and exploitation, as well
as population dynamics and stock assessment.223 The court’s
consideration of Dr. Miller’s testimony displays the challenges
associated with understanding the intricate natural processes
within the environment.
Dr. Miller’s extensive publication record includes more than
seventy peer-reviewed articles addressing issues relevant to blue
crab population dynamics, such as analyses comparing
productivity across multiple ecosystems.224 Further, Dr. Miller

222. See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 752-54 (finding causation
where the diversion of freshwater flow allegedly increased the bay’s salinity,
evidence was presented showing a negative effect of elevated salinity on blue
crab abundance, blue crab is believed to be a main source of food for whooping
cranes, and the death of several cranes was observed).
223. See Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, Thomas
James Miller, Ph.D., at 221-22, Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D.
Tex. 2013) (No. CA-C-10-075), 2011 WL 10904321. In his own words, Dr. Miller
described the primary focus of his studies as “blue crab in its natural
environment and in particular . . . on the impacts of commercial and
recreational harvests of blue crab in its natural environment.” Id. at 221.
224. See Thomas J. Miller, Curriculum Vitae, CHESAPEAKE BIOLOGICAL
LAB., http://hjort.cbl.umces.edu/people/Miller_2page_cv.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2015).
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has published in many peer-reviewed journals, including
contributions to highly respected titles.225
It is reasonable to presume that Dr. Miller could have offered
relevant insight to explain the decreasing abundance of blue
crabs, specifically as it related to decreasing salinities. Despite
the extensive publication record, Dr. Miller’s testimony did not
persuade the court to reconsider its opinion that increased
salinities, resulting from lack of freshwater inflow, were the sole
reason for the declining blue crab population within the bay.226
Aligned with the aforementioned difficulties described by
Professor Lazarus, multiple forces may have influenced the
decreasing blue crab abundance.227 For instance, the court did
not consider the effect of diminished local rainfall on the
increasing salinities in the estuary. Whereas temperature,
predation, and dissolved oxygen contribute to the distribution of
blue crabs throughout the estuary, many additional factors may
affect blue crab abundance.228 In his testimony, Dr. Miller
explained that scientists expect to see high inter-annual
variability in blue crab abundance, “[s]ome years physical factors
and random factors coincide in such a way that [blue crab]
reproductive success is considerably higher in one year than it is
in the other year.”229
Dr. Miller suggested that declines in blue crab abundance
along the Atlantic Coast may be similar to those observed along
the Texas Gulf Coast, primarily as a result of overexploitation by
the commercial fishing industry.230 In addition, because blue

225.

These peer-reviewed journals include well-respected titles such as

Science and Fisheries. See id.
226. See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 753-54.
227. See generally Lazarus, supra notes 149, at 745-48 (highlighting various

difficulties relating to the protection of the blue crab’s environment).
228. See Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s Expert Witness, Thomas
James Miller, Ph.D., supra note 223, at 243-45.
229. Id. at 244.
230. See id. at 246-47. The Texas Parks & Wildlife also acknowledges that
blue crab populations in Texas have declined for several decades. This decline is
likely the result of many factors, including overfishing or overcapitalization,
shrimp trawl bycatch, habitat loss or degradation, and reduced freshwater
inflow. See Glen Sutton & Tom Wagner, Stock Assessment of Blue Crab
(Callinectes sapidus) in Texas Coastal Waters, MANAGEMENT DATA SERIES No.
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crabs depend on low salinities in the estuary, the severe lack of
local rainfall may have been a primary factor influencing the low
salinities, not just the freshwater inflow.231 In fact, the court
noted significant declines in blue crab abundance over the entire
Texas coast from 1980 to 2009.232
When ESA liability is at stake, the magnitude of these random
variables demonstrates the need for proximate causation as a
threshold when proving the cause of a “take.” Though the court
discounted Dr. Miller’s testimony, this at least suggests that
healthy debate exists within the scientific community regarding
the reason for the blue crab decline. This aspect of the case
demonstrates the reason to include principles of proximate cause
when examining complex ecological data.
3.

Contradictory Approach to Daubert’s “Scientific
Knowledge” Framework

The court repeatedly mentioned Dr. Ronald Sass and his
Nobel Peace Prize to bolster his credibility as a biogeochemical
and statistical expert, seemingly in an effort to symbolize the
overall reliability of TAP’s expert scientific witnesses.233
Although Dr. Sass certainly deserves recognition for being an
excellent scientist, it is interesting to consider the relationship—
or lack thereof—between the Nobel Prize-winning research and
precise chain of causation at issue in Aransas Project.
Dr. Sass received the 2007 award for his contributions to
global warming research for the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC).234 In particular, he studied methane
249, at 1-4 (2007), available at https://tpwd.texas.gov/publications/pwdpubs/
media/pwd_rp_v3400_1440.pdf.
231. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 822 (5th Cir. 2014).
232. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
233. Id. at 744, 755-56. An additional reference to Dr. Sass’s Nobel Prize was
made in Judge Prado’s dissenting opinion to the Fifth Circuit’s denial of TAP’s
petition to rehear the matter. See Aransas Project v. Shaw (Aransas III), 774
F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2014) (Prado, J., dissenting).
234. Mike Williams, Rice’s Sass Honored for His Role in Nobel PrizeWinning Research on Global Warming, RICE UNIV. NEWS & MEDIA (May 29,
2008), http://news.rice.edu/2008/05/29/rices-sass-honored-for-his-role-in-nobelprize-winning-research-on-global-warming/. In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was
awarded to Dr. Sass, former Vice President Al Gore, and an additional 2500
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emissions from the bacterial decomposition of organic matter.
This research took place while coordinating the efforts of
scientists in many foreign locations, such as Thailand, Indonesia,
and Germany.235 Although impressive, the Court repeatedly
mentioned the accolade to strengthen the credibility of TAP’s
expert witnesses, despite not indicating a connection between
the Nobel research and South Texas whooping cranes.236
The continued reference to the award is perplexing, especially
because the climate change research lacked any specific
relationship with whooping cranes, the Guadalupe estuary, or
even Texas. In contrast, the Court did not find TCEQ expert Dr.
Miller’s testimony to be relevant, despite his extensive
knowledge of blue crabs, the main prey item of whooping cranes
and essential link in the chain of causation.237
Although Dr. Miller’s research involved blue crabs throughout
the Atlantic coast, the court concluded that his testimony lacked
credibility because it was not specific to blue crab populations in
Texas.238 If expertise regarding methane emissions in Thailand
is related to crane mortality and freshwater inflows in Texas,
then it is inconceivable to suggest that expertise regarding
Atlantic coast blue crabs is unrelated to testimony regarding
blue crabs in Texas.
In a similar approach, the court noted Dr. Sass’s publication
record as a basis for his credibility, specifically referencing that
his 165 peer-reviewed papers included one article on whooping
cranes.239 Alarmingly, the court criticized the credibility of
TCEQ expert Dr. Slack for his “insignificant knowledge on
whooping cranes in particular,” despite his extensive publication

IPCC scientists from over 130 nations for their research involving the link
between human activities and climate change. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 744, 755-56.
237. See id. at 753-54. The court found Dr. Miller’s lack of evidence on
several key points relevant to their its opinion. Id.
238. See id. at 754. See generally Transcript of Testimony of Defendant’s
Expert Witness, Thomas James Miller, Ph.D., supra note 223, at 240, 249-51
(showcasing Dr. Miller’s relevant testimony on his blue crab research).
239. Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
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record on the precise topic of whooping cranes in Texas coastal
ecosystems.240
Because the court chose to focus on the respective accolades of
expert witnesses, ecological testimony seemingly diverted the
attention away from establishing each link in the chain of
causation.
B.

Fifth Circuit’s Reversal on Proximate Causation Grounds

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
finding of ESA liability because the lower court did not consider
proximate causation in the holding.241 The Fifth Circuit’s focus
on proximate causation further underscores not only the
dichotomy between these two opinions, but also a broader issue
that pervades ESA liability and the “take” prohibition. Although
TAP attempted to establish that licensing resulted in whooping
crane deaths, the number of contingencies manipulating the
chain of causation demonstrates the lack of foreseeability.242 In
contrast with the lower court’s opinion, the Fifth Circuit
described the alleged chain of causation as a “fortuitous
confluence of adverse factors,” which resulted in the unexpected
240. Id. at 744, 768. Much of the ridicule directed at Dr. Slack stemmed from
a brief misunderstanding, at the end of cross-examination, on whether whooping
cranes possess supraorbital salt glands. Although this false impression may be
relevant from a scientific perspective, it is not an essential factor in proving
causation. Even so, the court mentioned it on multiple occasions. See id. at 744,
767-68.
241. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 816-24 (5th Cir. 2014). The
reversing opinion elicited a deep appreciation for proximate cause as an
important limit on liability, providing a detailed history of the Supreme Court’s
adherence to proximate causation principles. See id. at 817-821. The Fifth
Circuit quoted Prosser and Keeton to augment the importance of proximate
cause as a limit to prevent assigning liability based on attenuated
circumstances, “the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond.” Id. at 818
(citing W. KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (5th
ed. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit also referenced the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Exxon Co. to establish that proximate causation is a “necessary limitation on
liability,” because, in regards to attenuated circumstances, “somewhere a point
will be reached when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous—
that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity.” See id. (citing Exxon
Co., USA v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838 (1996)).
242. See id. at 822.
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crane die-off.243 The Fifth Circuit reversed because the
attenuated circumstances in the chain of causation lacked a
direct connection, such that “the contingencies [were] all outside
of the state’s control and often outside human control.”244 In fact,
the whooping crane population had increased both before and
after the winter of 2008-09.245
Accordingly, the district court failed to articulate “why the
remote connection between water licensing, decisions to
withdraw river water by hundreds of users, whooping crane
habitat, and crane deaths during a year of extraordinary drought
compels ESA liability.”246 As a matter of attenuation, the Fifth
Circuit rejected TAP’s salinity argument because an array of
natural conditions potentially affects salinity levels in the
Guadalupe estuary.247 The salinity levels are subject to
“unpredictable and uncontrollable. . .forces of nature,” such as
drought, decreased local rainfall, tides, and temperature.248 The
district court’s only mention of foreseeability was in the context
of a report that described the effect of TCEQ’s water permitting
on freshwater inflows.249 The report did not satisfy TAP’s burden
to establish foreseeability because it was non-specific, instead
predicting the potential for declining freshwater inflows over the
long-term.250

243. Id. at 823. Suggesting that the unexpected crane die-off was the
“essence of unforeseeability,” the Fifth Circuit drew an analogy to Judge Henry
Friendly’s hypothetical in which “a vessel colliding with a bridge should not be
held liable for the death of a patient whose doctor arrived late because of the
bridge closing.” Id. (citing Exxon Co., 517 U.S. at 838-39).
244. Id. at 822.
245. Id. at 820.
246. Id. at 818. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit noted that even if the district
court proved proximate cause, the injunction issued was still an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 806.
247. See id. at 820-22.
248. Id. at 822. Proximate cause serves as a limit on ESA liability in regards
to the multiple forces affecting ecosystems: “That these natural conditions can
change quickly is a truism, and that the seriousness or duration of a drought
cannot be foreseen in advance is equally trite. Texas is prone to cyclical drought
conditions, but the winter of 2008-09 was an outlier among those.” Id.
249. Id. at 821 (citing Aransas Project I, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 747 (S.D. Tex.
2013)).
250. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit focused primarily on whether TCEQ’s
permitting decisions to use river water for human,
manufacturing, and agricultural consumption foreseeably and
proximately caused the whooping crane deaths.251 The “multiple,
natural, independent, unpredictable, and interrelated forces
affecting the cranes estuary environment” prevented the Fifth
Circuit from finding that TCEQ’s licensing was the proximate
cause of the crane deaths.252 Proximate cause functions to limit
ESA liability, particularly in the context of complex ecological
testimony, because liability should not be based “on the
‘butterfly effect’ nor on remote actors in a vast and complex
ecosystem.”253
The district court assigned liability based on remote,
attenuated, and fortuitous events.254 The Fifth Circuit noted
that, in doing so, the lower court either misinterpreted the
relevant liability test or misconstrued the proximate cause
analysis.255 The proximate cause requirement is significant in
the context of ESA liability because it “preclude[s] liability when
the causal link between conduct and result is so attenuated that
the consequence is more aptly described as a mere fortuity.”256
For example, TCEQ’s overarching authority lies in its ability to
merely issue the permits that allow municipalities or individuals
to withdraw water. Thus, TCEQ does not compel or require
water withdrawal, even when they issue a permit. Further
complicating the causal link is the fact that some water uses are
not even required to obtain permits, such as withdrawals for
domestic and livestock purposes.257 The chain of causation
becomes more attenuated when factoring in the independent

251. See id. at 816-17.
252. Id. at 823.
253. Id. at 818. The Fifth Circuit described the ‘butterfly effect’ as a theory of
remote causation, defined as a situation where present conditions are the result
of a string of events set off by a seemingly inconsequential act. Id. at 818, n.10.
254. Id. at 817.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 818 (citing Paroline v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1719
(2014)).
257. See id. at 822. Water uses for domestic and livestock purposes are not
required to obtain permits. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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decisions made by individual water users, which influences the
amount of water diverted from Texas rivers.
The failure to apply the proximate cause analysis was
apparent in the lower court’s review of expert scientific
testimony.258 The Fifth Circuit’s sound criticism of the lower
court’s opinion illuminates the inherent challenges associated
with using ecological testimony to establish causation: “Every
link of this chain [of causation] depends on modeling and
estimation. At best, the court found but-for causation. Proximate
cause, however, requires the causal factors and the result to be
reasonably foreseeable.”259 Because TAP’s allegations were void
of the required close connection, finding proximate cause based
on this chain of causation would impose ESA liability for an
activity that is far outside the realm of current ESA
jurisprudence.260
Proximate cause is an important tool when proving the cause
of ecological injuries. By adhering to established legal principles,
the Fifth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates the practicality of
proximate cause as a limit on using scientific testimony to prove
causation within complex natural environments. Although
science is absolutely vital to the conservation of the whooping
cranes, the complex forces of nature in any given ecosystem
should limit scientific testimony from being the sole basis for
assigning ESA liability when an actor is alleged to have violated
the “take” prohibition.
C.

Fifth Circuit’s Denial of TAP’s Petition for Rehearing &
TAP’s Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States

On December 15, 2014, by an 11-4 vote, the Fifth Circuit
issued its opinion denying TAP’s petition for rehearing.261 In the
dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Edward C. Prado, offered
insight regarding the utility of scientific testimony to prove
258. See Aransas Project II, 756 F.3d at 820.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 819 (explaining that the district court’s factual findings are
not binding at the appellate level the appellate level when the district court has
used the improper proximate causation test).
261. Aransas Project III, 774 F.3d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 2014).
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causation.262 Judge Prado argued that the Fifth Circuit’s review
was inappropriate because the appellate court engaged in a de
novo reweighing of facts that was “particularly egregious.”263
Likely suggesting that TAP continue its appeal, Judge Prado
wrote that “the Supreme Court has reversed this Court before
for improperly reweighing the factual findings of district
courts.”264
Judge Prado’s reasoning was rooted in his opinion of the
validity of certain expert scientific witnesses.265 He referenced
the accolades of TAP’s witnesses, including their publication
records and the unrelated Nobel Prize.266 Similar to the district
court’s opinion, Judge Prado further disparaged the work of
TCEQ’s expert witnesses, referencing their supposed “limited
experience and insignificant expertise” despite the fact that
TCEQ’s witnesses, at a minimum, offered testimony that was
relevant to the specific task at hand.267
Based on the sentiment expressed in Judge Prado’s dissent,
TAP submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States.268 In particular, TAP sought the
Court’s review to determine “[w]hether ordinary standards of
proximate cause are satisfied by a foreseeable chain of events,
even if it involves intervening actors and forces of nature.”269 On
June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
TAP’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit’s
decision.270

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 326-331 (Prado, J., dissenting).
Id. at 327.
Id. at 325-26.
Aransas Project III, 774 F.3d at 326-28 (Prado, J., dissenting).
See id. at 327, 331.
Id. at 327.
See David Sikes, Whooper Appeal to Supreme Court Underway,

CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015, 9:43 AM), http://www.
caller.com/sports/outdoors/whooper-appeal-to-supreme-court-underway-ep891000556-314340061.html.
269. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, The Aransas Project v. Shaw, 2015 WL
1250863, at *ii (U.S., Mar. 16, 2015) (No. 14-1138).
270. See The Aransas Project v. Shaw, 135 S. Ct. 2859 (Mem.) (June 22,
2015).
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VI.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS & WHY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MADE THE
CORRECT DECISION
A.

Proximate Cause Alleviates the Potential for Treacherous
Precedent

Assigning liability for the “take” of a listed species can erode
the fabric of industry and progress. Lawyers, scientists, and
policymakers must recognize the differences in scientific
disciplines and how these distinctions relate to the admissibility
of expert testimony. To harmonize this tension, scientists must
understand that judges are experts in legal issues like proximate
causation, but judges must also realize the value in utilizing
scientific knowledge. Reconciling the gaps between science and
the law is vital, especially if ESA litigation continues to increase
in the future. Politicians express additional concern that despite
billions of dollars in federal funding, “the way the [ESA] was
written, there is more of an effort to list (species as endangered
or threatened) than to delist.”271
Rather than reevaluating the importance of Daubert in the
context of ecological testimony, the established legal principle of
proximate causation may serve as a more reliable foundation.
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal in Aransas Project was correct
because the trial court failed to adequately consider proximate
cause in the face of ecological testimony. The decision represents
the outer bounds of liability under the Sweet Home proximate
causation doctrine, “providing additional protection to private
parties and government agencies that issue licenses and
permits.”272 Aransas Project may set important precedent in the
context of ESA liability, particularly in the Courts of Appeals
that have maintained reluctance to adopt the proximate
causation requirement set forth in Sweet Home.273

271. GOP to Propose Changing Endangered Species Act , CBS NEWS (Feb. 4,
2014, 7:21 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gop-to-propose-changing-endan
gered-species-act/.
272. Richardson et al., supra note 92.
273. See id.
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Established legal principles are an important foundation,
particularly as environmental advocates champion the listing of
insects as threatened or endangered. In fact, the ESA recently
recognized thirty-one insect species as candidates for ESA
protection.274 Many scholars support this recent trend, as
commentators suggest that insects are traditionally underrepresented as listed species.275 Insects are forage for many
species, often serving as the primary diet for fish, birds, and
salamanders. Although the increase in listed insect species may
lead to litigation, the Fifth Circuit’s adherence to proximate
causation maintains a framework for courts to reach an
equitable result.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit found the proximate causation
standard in Aransas Project to be persuasive when it denied an
injunction sought by an environmental plaintiff.276 In California
River Watch v. County of Sonoma, the environmental non-profit
group alleged that the county violated the ESA by taking the
endangered California tiger salamander.277 Seeking a blanket
order to enjoin Sonoma County from issuing land-use permits
within a vast geographic area, the environmental group argued
for a similar injunction to the one granted by the district court in
Aransas Project.278 In California River Watch, the Ninth Circuit
not only denied the injunction, but further elaborated on the
proximate causation standard relied upon by the Fifth Circuit.279
274. See Review of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 79 Fed.
Reg. 72,450 (proposed Dec. 5, 2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (reviewing
native species that are candidates for listing as endangered or threatened).
275.
See generally Ezequiel Lugo, Insect Conservation under the
Endangered Species Act, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 97 (2007) (describing a
primary cause of insect under-representation as “a lack of qualified biologists to
file and review listing petitions.”).
276. See Cal. River Watch v. Cnty. Of Sonoma, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1204 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (relying on Aransas Project II to hold that the plaintiff did not
establish causation because its claim that development would threaten
salamanders lacked specificity, instead relying on modeling and approximation).
277. Id. at 1206.
278. Id. at 1211-12.
279. Id. at 1212. The Fifth Circuit in Aransas Project II specifically stated
that it was not a “take” where the “causal chain was ‘so attenuated that the
consequence [was] more aptly described as mere fortuity.’” Id. (quoting Aransas
Project II, 756 F.3d 801, 818, 823-24 (5th Cir. 2014)).
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In the context of future ESA cases, this suggests that the Ninth
Circuit may consider proximate causation when evaluating
causal chains.
B.

Future Tension Between State Water Rights and
Endangered Species Act Protection

Recent ESA decisions at the appellate level imply the
possibility of a meaningful Supreme Court opinion on the
horizon, with far-reaching ramifications for water users and
landowners.280 Significant legal implications arise with regard to
whether the federal ESA preempts state-created water rights
and state-authorized water management decisions.281 ESA
controversies will likely escalate as the effect of drought in
certain regions decreases the availability of water for protected
species. As conflicts between the ESA and state water law
intensify, scholars predict that there is “no simple resolution in
sight.”282
Courts have generally been disinclined to affirmatively rule on
the preemptive relationship between the federal ESA and state
water law at this point in ESA jurisprudence.283 As Aransas
Project depicts, “the exercise of state water rights. . .directly pits
a state law property right against a federal law prohibition.”284
Although ultimately decided on the basis of proximate causation,
the district court’s opinion would have set legal precedent that
the ESA preempts state water law.285 The court focused on the
actual conflict between the TCEQ’s authority to issue water
rights and the whooping cranes’ need for essential habitat and
resources. Indicative of future litigation, federal conflict
preemption determined the outcome of the Aransas Project case
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at the district court level, foreshadowing potential lawsuits that
allege the taking of vested property rights without
compensation.286 Proximate causation rightfully decided the
legal outcome of Aransas Project; however, in the case of less
attenuated circumstances, the controversial issue of federal
preemption will assuredly maintain a prominent role in future
ESA decisions.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Established legal principles are an important safeguard,
specifically in regards to assigning ESA liability in the context of
nature’s attenuated and complex circumstances. Proximate
causation offers a practical threshold for courts as uncertainties
prevalent in the environment present challenges for reconciling
ecological testimony within the scope of causation. Although
science is essential to the conservation of whooping cranes, the
complicated processes in nature should limit scientific testimony
from being the sole basis for assigning ESA liability when an
actor alleges to have violated the “take” prohibition. The Fifth
Circuit’s reversal in Aransas Project illustrates this conundrum,
because the lower court based its finding of ESA liability on a
remote and unconnected chain of causation.
Although the court’s focus on established legal principles may
limit opportunities for environmental groups to litigate and
expand the theory of ESA liability, proximate causation offers a
means to interject consistency into an already robust regulation.
Within the context of ESA liability for violations of the “take”
prohibition, proximate causation maintains an avenue of reason,
particularly in comparison to scientific testimony. Nature is
wicked, uncertain, and influenced by a mosaic of dynamic forces;
proximate causation thus represents a platform of stability for a
regulatory scheme that is essential to the conservation of many
protected species.
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